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Zubel: The Lockerbie Controversy

THE LOCKERBIE CONTROVERSY:
TENSION BETWEEN THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE AND THE SECURITY
COUNCIL
ERIC ZUBEL*

Pan American Flight 103 exploded midair over Lockerbie,
Scotland on December 21,1988. Investigations suggested that
two Libyan nationals were to blame. When the U.N. Security
Council imposed sanctions on the Libyan government in 1993
for its failure to cooperate with U.S. and U.K extradition
requests, Libya turned to the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) for help. Libya asked the ICJ to declare that Libya was
not obliged to extradite its nationals to the United States or the
United Kingdom and further asked the Court to enjoin the U.S.
and the U.K from the use of force or threats against Libya. In
1998, the ICJ found it had jurisdiction to hear the case, which
put two bodies of the United Nations on a collision course. The
author explores how the U.N. system handles its internal
tensions, and compares the international system with U.S.
federalism and civil rights. How far can judicial review reach
in the global system?

* Eric Zubel, A.B., University of Michigan; J.D., LL.M. International Legal
Studies, Golden Gate University School of Law, has practiced law in Nevada for more
than 25 years. He is a fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers and a member of
the Nevada Trial Lawyers Association. His practice includes commercial litigation and
business torts. He has appeared and argued before the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit and the Nevada Supreme Court in numerous reported cases.
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INTRODUCTION

1.

After Pan American Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie,
Scotland on December 21, 1988, with the death of 259
passengers and crew as well as eleven persons on the ground,
fixing the blame became the subject of endless speculation and
debate in the western media. One of the usual suspects,
Ahmed Jibril, a Palestinian terrorist reputed to be operating
out of Syria, was blamed for the crime. But as the criminal
investigation progressed and the advanced techniques of the
forensic sciences were put to work, the United States finally
announced almost three years later that the·true culprits were
two agents of Libyan Intelligence: Abdel Basset Ali lalMegrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah.
Both of these
individuals were indicted in the United States in November,
1991.
In any event, there resulted an immediate outcry from the
western press that the accused be "brought to justice" before
American and Scottish courts. In an article appearing on
November 14, 1991 in Newsday it was reported that,
"[A]ccording to the L.A. Times, U.S. authorities believe that the
attack on Flight 103 was orchestrated by Abdullah Sanussi,
Gaddhafi's brother-in-law and the head of Libyan
The case against Libya was apparently
intelligence."l
strengthened on account of a French investigation implicating
Libya in a 1989 French VTA bombing. The suggestion was
made that "forensic connections" were established between the
UTA and Pan Am bombings. Nonetheless, the article quoted
William Webster, recently retired as FBI chief, who suggested
that "a number of nations" were involved. He went on to note
that, "it has been pieced together like a mosaic with sometimes
new information changing views on the exact players and the
manner in which they played.'>2 How this "mosaic" is reflected
in the, indictments remains unclear, although a considerable

1.
2.

NEWSDAY, Nov. 14, 1991, at 7.
[d.
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amount of forensic evidence was released to the press.3 The
Economist echoed the Newsday story in an article appearing
two days later, but suggested that the Iranians hired the
Libyans to arrange the bombing.4 On November 25, 1991 Time
magazine carried an article by George J. Church entitled
"Solving the Lockerbie Case. rn; The article detailed reprisals
that could be taken against Libya, which was implicated in
part on the basis of the French investigation. The forensic
evidence that was disclosed tied the bombing to Libya, based
upon the CIA's capture of an unexploded bomb belonging to
terrorists supported by Libyans in African Togo. In addition,
the bomb's timing device was allegedly, ". . . one of twenty
delivered to a Libyan official in 1985 and 1986.'>6 Additional
evidence tied an official of Libyan Airlines to one of the accused
and detailed the placement of the bomb on an Air Malta flight
to Frankfurt where it was transferred to Flight 103.
While this evidence appeared more than sufficient to obtain
indictments, considerable pressure was building in the western
press that Libya be punished, notwithstanding the fact that the
accused were yet to be brought to trial. George J. Church
posed the question in the Time magazine article asking, "how
can he [Ghaddafi] and his regime be punished?,fl
Armed with the results of this criminal investigation and the
forensic evidence which it produced, the U.S. and the U.K.
demanded the extradition of the accused from Libya. Upon
Libya's refusal, the U.S. and the U.K. took the matter to the
United Nations Security Council.
On January 21, 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution
731. 8 This Resolution "implicated" officials of the Libyan
government in the attack against Pan American Flight 103,

3. Douglas Frantz; Ronald J. Ostrow, Jet Probe: Real-Life Whodunit History's
biggest terrorism investigation spanned 40 countries. Two tiny electronics fragments
and a diary were the keys to the Pan Am Case, Los ANGELES TIMES, 11115/91, at 1.
4. Lockerbie's Murderers, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 1991, at 51.
5. George J. Church, Solving The Lockerbie Case, TIME, Nov. 25, 1991, at 62.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. U.N. SCOR, 3033d mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES 731 (1992).
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"deplore[d]" the fact that the Libyan government "has not yet
responded effectively to the above requests to cooperate fully in
establishing responsibility for the terrorist acts referred to
above ... " and concluded by urging the Libyan government to
accede to the requests of the U.S. and the U.K. in cooperating
with the prosecution of the persons charged.
Three days earlier Libya had requested that the dispute be
arbitrated with the U.S. and the U.K. in accordance with the
1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.9 This request was
rejected and on March 3, 1992 Libya sought relief in the
International Court of Justice. Libya applied to the court for
provisional measures against the U.S. and the U.K., including
(a) a declaration from the court that Libya has fully complied
with its obligations under the Montreal Convention; (b) that
the United States has breached its legal obligations to Libya
under Articles 5(2), 5(3), 7, 8(2), and 11 of the Montreal
Convention; and (c) that the court declare the United States
"immediately to cease and desist from such breaches and from
the use of any and all force or threats against Libya, including
the threat of force against Libya and from all violations of the
sovereignty,
territorial
integrity,
and
the
political
independence of Libya . . . .,llO . Libya informed the court on
March 3, 1992 that provisional measures needed to be taken
promptly to preserve Libya's rights in light of the fact that "the
United States had indicated that it might seek or impose
economic, air and other sanctions against Libya if Libya did not
comply with the demands of the United States, and that the
latter had refused to rule out the use of armed force against
Libya. . . ,>11 Finally, Libya argued "that only by granting
provisional measures enjoining the United States from taking
such actions against Libya was it possible to prevent Libya's

9. Montreal Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against The Safety
of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971,24 U.S.T. § 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570.
10. International Court of Justice: Order With Regard To Request For the
Indication of Provisional Measure In The Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From The Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libya v. United States), Apr. 14, 1992, 311.L.M. 662, 667.
11. [d.
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rights from being irreparably prejudiced either in fact or in
law ... ,,12
By letter dated March 6, 1992 the United States responded to
the court by stating that:
... taking into account both the absence of any
concrete showing of urgency relating to the
request and developments in the ongoing action
by the Security Council and the Secretary
General in this matter. . . the action requested
by Libya . . . is unnecessary and could be
misconstrued. 13
On April 14, 1992 the court voted 11 to 5 against indicating
provisional measures. As it will be shown, of considerable
significance in reaching this decision was the impact of
Security Council Resolution 748 which was adopted on March
31, 1992, barely two weeks before the court's decision. 14 The
Security Council announced its deep concern that the Libyan
government had not effectively responded to Resolution 731
and announced its determination:
... in this context that the failure by the Libyan
government to demonstrate, by concrete actions,
its renunciation of terrorism, and in particular
its continued failure to respond fully and
effectively to the requests and Resolution 731
(1992), constitute a threat to international
peace and security ...
Purporting to act under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations, the Security Council demanded (1) Libya's
immediate compliance with Resolution 731; (2) that the Libyan
government commit itself to cease from all forms of terrorist
action and assistance to terrorist groups; and (3) enjoined "all
states ... [to] ... adopt the measures set out below which shall

12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id. at 668.
U.N. SCOR, 3036d mtg., U.N.Doc SIRES 748 (1992).
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apply until the Security Council decides that the Libyan
government has complied . . ."15
The Resolution then
enumerated
comprehensive
sanctions
against
Libya,
particularly with respect to the ingress and egress of aircraft
from Libya, the supplying of aircraft or aircraft parts or
maintenance, as well as the prohibition of arms transfers or the
providing of military advisors to be followed by a reduction of
Libyan diplomatic and consular staffs in each state.
On November 11, 1993 the Security Council passed Resolution
883 16 upon Libya's failure to comply with Resolutions 731 and
748.
This time the Security Council made its position
unmistakably clear that Libya must extradite the accused to
the United Kingdom or the United StatesP
On February 27, 1998, the ICJ· rendered its judgment
concerning its jurisdiction to proceed and adjudicate the
dispute between the parties under the Montreal Convention,
voting 13 to 2 to proceed with the case. 1S The ICJ was now on a
direct collision course with the Security Council.

15. Presumably, Libya's failure to surrender the accused is now the basis for the
imposition ofthese sanctions. [d.
16. U.N. SCOR, 3312 tb mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES 883 (1993).
17. Paragraph 16 provides: "... Expresses its readiness to review the measures set
forth above and in resolution 748 (1992) with a view to suspending them immediately if
the Secretary-General reports to the Council that the Libyan Government has ensured
the appearance of those charged with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 for trial before
the appropriate United Kingdom or United States court and has satisfied the French
judicial authorities with respect to the bombing of [Union de Transports Aeriens flight)
772, and with a view to lifting them immediately when Libya complies fully with the
requests and decisions in resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992); and requests the
Secretary-General, within ninety days of such suspension, to report to the Council on
Libya's compliance with the remaining provisions of its resolutions 731(1992) and
748(1992») and, in the case of non-compliance, expresses its resolve to terminate
immediately the suspension of these measures .... " [d.
18. International Court of Justice: Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States), February 27, 1998, 37 I.L.M.
587,609.
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II. THE INITIAL REQUEST BY LIBYA FOR THE
INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
The presumption of innocence is a fundamental tenet of AngloAmerican law, deeply rooted in our judicial heritage. An
indictment does not constitute evidence of guilt, at least in U.S.
criminal jurisprudence. Every accused enters the court an
innocent man, however compelling the evidence against him.
Every American jury is so instructed by the court prior to
retiring for its deliberations. The maxim in dubio pro reo is
fundamental to certain civil law systems as well.
It should come as no surprise that Libya would seek
provisional remedies in this case. The last time the Libyans
found themselves in a dispute with the United States, the case
involved the bombing of a nightclub in Berlin that was
frequented by American servicemen.
Libya suffered a
humiliating bombing raid on her capital city, military
installations and airports. The legality of that raid will not be
discussed here; suffice it to say that it certainly would provide
an impetus to Libya to preempt such action by resort to the
ICJ.

The ICJ first noted that the Application by the Socialist
Peoples Libyan-Arab Jamahiriya had been instituted on March
3, 1992 "in respect of Oa dispute ... between Libya and the
United States over the interpretation of application of the
Montreal Convention' of September 23, 1971, a dispute arising
from acts resulting in the aerial incident that occurred over
Lockerbie, Scotland on 21 December, 1988 ... " The court
found that the Application should be denied, but without
prejudice to the exercise of jurisdiction over the underlying
dispute. 19

19. International Court of Justice: Order With Regard To Request For the
Indication of Provisional Measure In The Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From The Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libya v. United States), Apr. 14, 1992,31 LL.M. 662, 665-666.
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In its submission to the court, Libya emphasized that it was
not a party to any extradition treaty with the U.S. and the U.K.
and that no basis existed for the extradition of the accused
under Article 8, Paragraph 2 of the Montreal Convention.20 In
requesting provisional measures, Libya asked the ICJ to
declare that the Montreal Convention should govern the
manner of resolving the dispute, and that resort to other
measures should be precluded. In support of this argument,
Libya pointed out that the U.S. and the U.K. had rebuffed
efforts to resolve this dispute by resort to the procedures
outlined in the Montreal Convention.21 Libya's ultimate
objective was to enjoin the U.S. and the U.K. from compelling
Libya to surrender the accused individuals or suffer the
imposition of sanctions.
III. THE PROSPECT OF CONFLICTING JURISDICTION
BETWEEN THE ICJ AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

A. THE DILEMMA FACED BY THE ICJ IN CONSIDERATION OF
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

There appears to be general agreement among commentators
that concurrent jurisdiction exists between the Security
Council and the ICJ in disputes such as thiS. 22 Article 35(1) of
the United Nations Charter is the authority by which a
member state may petition· the Security Council in respect to
"any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in
Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council ... " Article
34 of the U.N. Charter permits the Security Council to
"investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to
international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to

20. Id. at 666-667. Article 8, Paragraph 2 of the Montreal Convention provides:
''Article B.2. If a contracting State which makes extradition conditional on the
existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Contracting State
with which it has no extradition treaty, it may at its option consider this Convention as
the legal basis for extradition in respect of the offences. Extradition shall be subject to
the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State."
21. Id. at 668-669.
22. See Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Relationship Between the International Court
of Justice and the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case, 80 AM. J. INTL'L.
L. 643 (1994).
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determine whether the continuance of the dispute or the
situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security." A reasonable belief by one state that
another is responsible for detonating a bomb on one of its
airliners certainly qualifies as a dispute likely to lead to
international friction.
On the other hand, Article 38 of the statute of the International
Court of Justice confers upon it jurisdiction to "decide in
accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it ... " Subsection A of the statute specifically
provides that it apply international law to those disputes
affecting "international conventions, whether general or
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the
contesting states . .." Similarly, Article 36 of the statute
expressly confers jurisdiction upon the court "in all legal
disputes concerning ...the interpretation of a treaty ..." The
treaty to be interpreted here is the Montreal Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation. 23 Article 14(1) of the treaty specifically confers
jurisdiction upon the ICJ to adjudicate any dispute between
two or more contracting parties, upon the failure of arbitration,
at the request of anyone of those parties.
The aerial incident occurred on December 21, 1988. The
application for measures to be taken by the Security Council
was not made until January 1992. The Security Council acted
with remarkable alacrity, especially considering the
remoteness of the incident to the indictment of the accused.
The quality of the evidence submitted to the Security Council
during the three days of hearings before it is beyond the scope
of this article; one wonders however, whether it would have
been sufficient in a United States court to convict the accused.
As noted above, the indictment is not admissible as evidence of
guilt. Based upon the record before the court, it is not
surprising that it chose the prudent course of avoiding a direct
collision with the Security Council on the question of

23.

[d. See also 24 U.S.T. § 565.
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abstaining from

B. JURIDICAL BASIS FOR THE DENIAL OF PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

The application for provisional remedies was not unlike that
which is made by a party seeking injunctive relief in an
American court. The applicant must demonstrate there is
lacking a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law and that injunctive relief is necessary to avoid
irreparable harm and injury.
Some of this equitable
jurisprudence is evident from the arguments made by the
parties.
In this respect the juridical basis for denying
provisional remedies is reasonable especially since the court
did not foreclose the right of the parties to bring their disputes
before the court according to the terms of the Montreal
Convention. In this respect the Convention could provide an
adequate remedy in the ordinaryeourse oflaw.
The rush to adopt Security Council Resolution 748 on March
31, 1992 undoubtedly was designed to preempt the court from
granting Libya's application for provisional remedies which
had been pending since March 3rd. The Security Council
betrayed its true motivation when it pressured Libya at a time
when Libya was seeking the aid of the court. Perhaps the
intention was to pressure the court as well.
Judge Shahabuddeen recognized the difficult position in which
the court was placed by Resolution 748 when he observed in his
separate opinion supporting the denial of provisional remedies:
The question now raised by Libya's challenge to
the validity of Resolution 748 (1992) is whether
a decision of the Security Council may override
the legal rights of states, and, if so, whether
there are any limitations of the power of the
Council to characterize a situation. as one
justifying the making of a decision entailing
such consequences. Are there any limits to the
Council's powers of appreciation?
In the
equilibrium of forces underpinning the

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol5/iss1/10
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structure of the United Nations within the
evolving international order, is there any
conceivable point beyond which a legal issue
may properly arise as to the competence of the
Security Council to produce such overriding
results? If there are any limits, what are those
limits and what body, if other than the Security
Council, is competent to say what those limits
are? If the answers to these delicate and
complex questions are all in the negative, the
position is potentially curious. It would not, on
that account, be necessarily unsustainable in
law; and how far the court can enter the field is
another matter. The issues are however
important, even though they cannot be
examined now." (Emphasis Added.l4
Judge Shahabuddeen had earlier pointed out in his OpInIOn
that an important ground for denying the provisional remedies
to Libya was the fact that while sanctions were to be
implemented through Resolution 748, the use of force was not.
Because of the fact that the United States sought those
sanctions, it could not legitimately resort to force without
permission of the Security Council and on this basis Judge
Shahabuddeen wrote "[s]o on this point the Resolution of the
Security Council stands in the way, both on the law and on the
facts.,,25
This attitude is reflected in the order itself in which the court
found that, "in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, the
obligations of the parties in that respect prevail over their
obligations under any other international agreement, including
the Montreal Convention ... "26 On that basis, the court found:

24. International Court of Justice: Order With Regard To Request For the
Indication of Provisional Measure In The Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From The Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libya v. United States), Apr. 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 662, 679.
25. [d.
26. [d. at 671. Article 103 of the United Nations Charter provides:
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... in order to pronounce on the present request

for provisional measures, the court is not called
upon to determine any of the other questions
which have been raised before it in the present
proceedings, including the question of its
jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the case;
and . . . the decision given in these proceedings
in no way prejudices any such questions ... 27
In other words, the court left all of its options open.
C. THE JURIDICAL BASIS FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF PROVISIONAL
REMEDIES

In an eloquent dissenting opinion, Judge Bedjaoui brought into
clear focus the need for recognizing the differing roles of the
Security Council and the ICJ. He observed that here, while
two separate organs of the United Nations are exercising
jurisdiction over the same controversy, the Security Council is
exercising essentially a political function while the court must
exercise a judicial function. 28 As long as the court has
jurisdiction over a controversy, it can and should do so without
concern of the political consequences which implicate Security
Council resolutions. While this may be a fine distinction, it is
worth making; as Judge Bedjaoui observed, there are really
two disputes between the parties:
... the fIrst dispute concerns the extradition of
two Libyan nationals and is being dealt with,
legally, by the court at the request of Libya,
whereas the second dispute concerns, more
generally, state terrorism as well as the
international responsibility of the Libyan state
and is being dealt with politically, by the

"In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.·
27. [d.
28. [d. at 680.
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Security Council, at the request of the United
Kingdom and the United States.'>29
Bedjaoui reasoned that provisional remedies were appropriate
to preserve the status quo until the court could rule on the legal
question while at the same time the Security Council was free
to consider the political aspects of the ". . . demand of
compensation for the families of the victims and the imposition
of an obligation concretely to renounce terrorism .. .'~o
But where the dissent takes issue with the majority, "... lies in
the fact that the Security Council not only has decided to take a
number of political measures against Libya, but has also
demanded from it the extradition of its two nationals.'Cl
Bedjaoui characterized this as an "overlap" with respect to the
Security Council encroaching on the legal authority of the court
to decide what is purely a legal matter "on the basis of the 1971
Montreal Convention and international law in general.'~2
Judge Bedjaoui recognized that Article 41 of the statute of the
ICJ confers jurisdiction upon the court to render the
provisional remedies requested and that the court was also
obligated to ". . . grant every procedural safeguard to the
alleged perpetrators and to protect them from the hasty
judgments of public opinion or the mass media ... ~3 At issue
was Libya's sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as the
right under United Nations Charter and international law to
be free from the threat or use of force.
Those dissenting judges supporting the application for
provisional remedies generally believed that the court should
have exercised its authority to prevail upon the parties to avoid

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. emphasis added.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 682.
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the use of force because of the inevitable aggravation of the
dispute which would otherwise result.34
IV. ASSUMPTION BY THE ICJ OF JURISDICTION TO
HEAR THE MERITS OF THE CONTROVERSY

A. THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF ASSUMING JURISDICTION
On February 27, 1998, the ICJ entered its judgment over the
preliminary objections of the U.S. and the U.K. and assumed
jurisdiction of this controversy. The vote was 13 to 2 with
President Schwebel and Judge Oda dissenting.35
The principal focus of the judgment is the applicability of the
Montreal Convention which binds all of the parties before the
court and which specifically provides for ICJ jurisdiction to
resolve disputes under the treaty.36 The arbitration provisions
contained in the treaty were important to the court in
assuming jurisdiction over this dispute. As the court pointed
out in Paragraph 20 of the judgment:
Consequently, in the opinion of the court the
alleged dispute between the parties could not be
settled by negotiation or submitted to
arbitration under the Montreal Convention, and
the refusal of Respondent to enter into
arbitration to resolve that dispute absolved
Libya from any obligation under Article 14,

34. [d. at 669 (dissenting opinion by Judge Ajibola) and at 707 (dissenting opinion
of Judge El-Kosheri).
35. International Court of Justice: Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), February 27, 1998,
37I.L.M. 587, 618, 63l.
36. Article 14.1 of the Montreal Convention provides:
"Any dispute between two or more Contracting States concerning the interpretation
or application of this Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation, shall, at
the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the
date of the request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organization
of the arbitration, anyone of those Parties may refer the dispute to the International
Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court." 24 U.S.T. §
564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 10 l.L.M. 1151 (1971).
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paragraph 1 of the Convention to observe a sixmonth period starting from the request for
arbitration, before seising the court.37
Of concern to the court was whether, as a matter of law, there
existed a dispute over which it could exercise jurisdiction.
Quoting from the judgment of June 30, 1995 In the Case
Concerning East Timor (Portugal u. Australia):
In order to establish the existence of dispute, "it
must be shown that the claim of one party is
positively opposed by the other." (Southwest
Africa, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ
Reports 1962, page 328); and further "(w]hether
there exists an international dispute is a matter
for objective determination" (Interpretations of
Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 1950, page 74). (lCJ Reports 1995, page
100).38
Only the Montreal Convention could provide the framework for
the resolution of this dispute.39 As a sovereign state, Libya
enjoys the right under international law and the Montreal
Convention to exercise jurisdiction over the two alleged

37. International Court of Justice: Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), February 27, 1998,
37 I.L.M. 587, 598.
3B. [d.
39. In paragraph 22 of the judgment, the court listed the following reasons why
the Montreal Convention governed the rights of the parties:
(a) the Respondent and Libya are bound by the Montreal Convention which is in
force between the Parties;
(b) the Montreal Convention is specifically aimed at preventing that type of action
(third paragraph of the Preamble);
(c) the actions ascribed to the Libyan nationals are covered by Article 1 of the
Montreal Convention;
(d) the system of the Montreal Convention, as compared to the system of the
Charter, is both a lex posterior and a lex specialis; [consequently,] for matters covered
by that Convention, it must a priori take precedence over the systems for which the
Charter provides; and
(e) there is no other convention concerning international criminal law in force which
is applicable to these issues in the relations between Libya and the United States.
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offenders, on the basis of the Libyan Penal Code, free of any
interference from the U.S. or the U.K.40
A more difficult and somewhat murky aspect of the judgment is
found in a discussion under Paragraphs 48 and 49 in which the
court attempts to dispose of the request of the United States
that the court determine that it has no grounds for proceeding
to judgment on the merits in light of the fact that the Security
Council-Resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) have rendered
Libya's claims· moot.41 The court found that to do so would
require the parties to fully plead the merits which would result
in "an unnecessary prolongation of an expensive and timeconsuming procedure.'>42 The court did not feel that the
alternative, i.e. resolving the matter at the preliminary stage,
was viable under the circumstances of this case given the fact
that a decision on the merits was implicated in the process of
resolving preliminary objections to jurisdiction and mootness.
As the judgment states in paragraph 49:
The court therefore has no doubt that Libya's
rights on the merits would not only be affected
by a decision not to proceed to judgment on the
merits, at this stage in the proceedings, but
would constitute, in many respects, the very
subject matter of that decision. The objection
raised by the United States on that point has
the character of a defense on the merits. In the
view of the Court, this objection does much
more than "touch(ing) upon subjects belonging

40. [d. at 600.
41. Resolution 883 (1993) imposed additional sanctions upon Libya. These
consisted of urging all states in which funds or fmancial resources of Libya were in
their possession to freeze such assets; severe travel restrictions with respect to
nationals of other states wishing to travel to Libya, close all Libyan Arab Airline offices
within their territories; seize any commercial transactions with Libyan Airlines;
prohibit the training of Libyan pilots; etc. Notably exempt from the sanctions were
petroleum or petroleum products, including natural gas and natural gas products
originating in Libya. [d. at 606 and see also SIRES 883(1993), supra note 15, at 1-6f.
42. International Court of Justice: Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), February 27, 1998,
37 I.L.M. 587, 607.
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(Emphasis

One is left with the impression that the court felt itself being
led into a procedural trap by the United States the result of
which would have either resulted in a summary dismissal of
the case or an ad hoc decision on the merits in the course of
disposing of preliminary objections.
B. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION

The respondents succeeded in persuading only three judges of
the correctness of their positions, those being President
Schwebel, Judge Oda, and Judge Sir Robert Jennings.44 On the
question of jurisdiction, President Schwebel stated that no real
dispute existed between the parties according to the provisions
of the Montreal Convention principally because the United
States, as a victim, had not invoked its provisions and by
declining to do so had avoided creating a dispute between the
parties which could be subject to the Convention. Because
Libya itself as a state was accused of having procured the
destruction of the aircraft (as opposed to those circumstances
which are envisioned as purely terrorist acts by individuals
over whom states may exercise criminal jurisdiction) the
Convention could have no application. President Schwebel
suggested "the Convention would hardly have deterrent effect
if the state accused of having directed the sabotage were the
only state competent to prosecute the persons accused of the
act." He went on to note that "[a]t the same time, Article 1 of
the Convention capaciously provides that DAny person'
commits an offense under the Convention if he performs an act

43. Id. at 607.
44. Judge Jennings sat as a member of the court in the companion case in which
Libya named the U.K as a respondent. See International Court of Justice: Case
Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v.
U.K) (visited January 23, 1999) <http://www.icj-cij.org/idockeUllukliluk2frame.htm>
(Sir Robert Jennings, J., dissenting).
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thereafter listed. Moreover, Libya has not accepted that the
accused were agents of its Government.'>45
President Schwebel believed that Libya's failure to obtain a
judgment on the merits from the court prior to the adoption of
Security Council Resolutions 748 and 883 necessarily means
that the Resolutions "are binding and govern the Montreal
Convention by virtue of Article 103 of the Charter.'>i6 For the
court to assume jurisdiction over this dispute would require it
to assume authority to "overturn the Council's determination
under Chapter VII of the existence of a threat to the peace and
its choice of measures to deal with the threat.'>47 Accordingly,
because the Security Council has acted and the issues between
the parties have been determined, there is nothing for the court
to decide except to acknowledge its responsibility to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council.
Writing a dissenting opinion in the companion case in which
the United Kingdom is the named respondent, Judge Sir
Robert Jennings also argued that the court lacked jurisdiction
over this controversy.
Judge Jennings questioned the
applicability of the Montreal Convention to the dispute,
observing that, "[t]he citation of the Convention as a whole also
invites speculation as to whether it was ever intended to deal
with acts of terrorism allegedly committed by persons actually
employed by a government also allegedly involved in the
commission of those acts.'!48 Because Libya has chosen neither
to extradite the suspects nor try them by exercising Libyan
criminal jurisdiction, he reasoned that the Montreal
Convention has no application to the controversy and the
parties are subject only to the provisions of the United Nations
Charter as implemented by the Security Council. In other
45. International Court of Justice: Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), February 27, 1998,
37 I.L.M. 587, 619 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
46. [d. at 621.
47. [d. quoting from the language of Article 25.
48. International Court of Justice: Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K) (visited January 23, 1999) <http://www.icjcij.org/idocketJilukJiluk2frame.htm> (Sir Robert Jennings, J., dissenting).
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words, Libya could have avoided the necessity of applying to
the court for provisional measures if Libya had simply chosen
to prosecute the suspects in Libyan custody.
On the subject of extradition, Judge Oda suggested that, "[t]he
rule of non-extradition of political criminals has long prevailed
but that rule does not apply in the case of some universal
crimes such as genocide and acts of terrorism."49 Judge Oda
then observed that under the Montreal Convention Libya could
assume the responsibility to prosecute the accused if they were
not to be extradited and whether Libya chooses to do so or
extradite them to a "politically neutral" state does not create an
issue within the Montreal Convention. Judge Oda made the
rather remarkable observation that no legal dispute existed
between Libya and the u.S. which was covered by the Montreal
Convention. This is based upon the premise that under the
Montreal Convention, in the absence of extradition, the state
where the accused is located is obligated to commence
prosecution. The decision to prosecute itself is an exercise of
sovereignty or, as Judge Oda put it, "... respective policies
towards criminal justice ... " which do not "... fall within the
ambit of the Montreal Convention.'fjO Applying this reasoning,
Judge Oda concluded that no dispute existed between the
parties under the Convention and that no grounds could exist
for the court to exercise jurisdiction to hear this case.
Despite the cleverness of the arguments of the dissenting
judges against the assumption of jurisdiction, the plain
language of Article 14 places jurisdiction of this dispute
squarely with the ICJ.

49. International Court of Justice: Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), February 27, 1998,
37 l.L.M. 587, 635.
50. [d. at 635.
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v.

THE PROSPECT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS BY THE ICJ

There has been a tremendous temptation among American
commentators to draw analogies between the "judicial review"
of Security Council resolutions by the ICJ with the power
which John Marshall assumed for the United States Supreme
Court in Marbury v. Madison,51 which established the power of
the federal judiciary to review the constitutionality of acts of
the legislative and executive branches.52
But there are important distinctions to be made between the
constitutional relationship between these three distinct
branches of government and the relationship that exists
between the Security Council, the General Assembly and the
International Court of Justice under the U.N. Charter. While
it is true that the United States Supreme Court has frequently
abstained from exercising jurisdiction over controversies which
it considers to be "political questions," it nonetheless possesses
significant power arising directly from the Constitution to
support the exercise of judicial review. The political question
doctrine was succinctly defined by Justice Stevens where he
wrote: 53
When a court concludes that an issue presents a
nonjusticiable political question, it declines to
address the merits of that issue. In invoking
the political question doctrine, a court
acknowledges
the
possibility
that
a
constitutional provision may not be judicially
enforceable. Such a decision is of course very
different from determining that specific
congressional action does not violate the
Constitution. That determination is a decision

51. 5 u.s. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
52. See e.g., Robert F. Kennedy, Libya v. United States: The International Court of
Justice and the Power of Judicial Review, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 899 (1993) and see also,
Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 22, at 643.
53. United States Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992).
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on the merits that reflects the exercise of
judicial review, rather than the abstention from
judicial review that would be appropriate in the
case of a true political question. 54 (Citations
Omitted)
The political question doctrine came before the United States
Supreme Court the following year in Nixon v. United States. 55
In that case, Walter L. Nixon, a United States District Judge,
impeached by the Senate, objected to the fact that he was not
tried by the full Senate but rather a committee of senators
guided by "managers."
The court reasoned that the
Constitution does not contemplate judicial review of Senate
procedures in impeachment matters which are exclusive to that
body. The court contrasted the impeachment process with
specific references in the Constitution to the availability of
judicial review of certain acts of Congress having to do with
bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.
M.C.W. Pinto made the observation56 that in contrast, the U.N.
Charter grants no specific authority to the ICJ to review the
legality of Acts of the Security Council or General Assembly
and as such there is no grant of "constitutional" authority for
the court to act.
However, not all would agree that the Court may, in the
absence of specific textual authorization from the Charter,
make a determination of the legality of Security Council
actions. In that connection, it is often recalled that the Belgian
proposal at the San Francisco Peace Conference to confer on
the court a general power to resolve disputes concerning
interpretation of the Charter could not be adopted.57 (Citations
Omitted).

54.
55.
56.

[d. at 457-458.
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
M.C.W. PINTo, Pre-Eminence of the International Court of Justice, INCREASING
THE EFFECTNENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 280 (C. Peck and R.S.
Lee, Eds., 1997).
57. Id. at page 301.
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Nonetheless, Pinto and other commentators have observed that
the court does have the power to render advisory opinions and
has done so in connection with other important cases.58
Advisory opinions may be requested by Article 96 of the U.N.
Charter which specifically grants the power to the General
. Assembly or the Security Council· to request an advisory
opinion of the court on any legal question.59
The question is presented differently in those situations where
an active dispute exists between states and an advisory opinion
is requested by one of them. This occurred in the Western
Sahara Cases. But in those cases the legality of Security
Council resolutions was not at issue, only ongoing disputes
between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania.
In the Namibia Case, the ICJ had occasion to consider its
powers of judicial review with respect to the contention by the
governments of France and South Africa that General
Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI) was ultra vires. The court
made the following observation in Paragraph 89 of its
judgment:
Undoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers
of judicial review or appeal in respect of the
decisions taken by the United Nations organs
concerned. The question of the validity or
conformity with the Charter on General
Assembly 2145 (XXI) or of related Security
Council resolutions does not form the subject of
the request for [an] advisory opinion. However,
in the exercise of its judicial function and since
objections have been advanced the Court, in the
course of its reasoning, will consider these

58. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (S.W. Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J.
16 (Jun. 21) and see also, ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12
(Oct. 16}.
59. By way of contrast, the United States Supreme Court will never render an
advisory opinion; in the absence of an actual case or controversy before the court, a
party lacks standing to seek any relief.
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objections before determining any legal
consequences arising from those resolutions.GO
When Judge Weeramantry wrote his dissenting opinion after
the court's denial of Libya's application for provisional
remedies on April 14, 1992, he provided a detailed historical
and legal analysis of the propriety of ICJ judicial review of a
Security Council resolution. G1 While recognizing that the ICJ
cannot function as an appellate court within the framework of
the United Nations system, it must nonetheless recognize its
role as "... the principle judicial organ of the United Nations
charged with the task, inter alia, of deciding in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it .. .'>62 As
such, ". . . the court acts as guardian of the Charter and of
international law for in the international arena, there is no
higher body charged with judicial functions and with the
determination of questions of interpretation and application of
international law.'>63 Judge Weeramantry astutely observed
that even in issues involving the maintenance of international
peace and security, " . . . the Charter confers no exclusive
competence on anyone principal organ. >l64
This view is in contrast to that espoused by Judge Sir Robert
Jennings. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Jennings observed
that the Court is obliged "to act always as the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations.'>65 In so doing, it must simply
apply applicable United Nations law. However, once the
Security Council, exercising its discretion under Article 39 of
the Charter determines that there exists a "threat to the

60. 1971 LC.J. 16 supra note 58 (advisory opinion).
61. International Court of Justice: Order With Regard To Request For the
Indication of Provisional Measure In The Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From The Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libya v. United States), Apr. 14, 1992, 31 LL.M. 662, 668-699.
62. [d. at 691.
63. [d. at 691. (Emphasis added).
64. [d. at 691. (Emphasis added).
65. International Court of Justice: Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) (visited January 23, 1999)
<http://www.icj-cij.org/idocketJilukiiluk2frame.htm> (Sir Robert Jennings, J.,
dissenting).
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peace," the court has no business substituting its judgment for
that of the Security Council. In his consideration of the
Namibia Case, Judge Jennings.wrote:
That there is no power of judicial review of
Security Council decisions under Chapter VII of
the Charter is not merely because of the dictum
of the Court in the Namibia case. The position
is established by the provisions of the Charter
itself. Moreover it is evident from the records of
San Francisco that a power of judicial review
was proposed and rejected by the drafting
conference. The Court is not a revising body, it
may not substitute its own discretion for that of
the Security Council; nor would it in my view be
a suitable body for doing that; nor is the
forensic adversarial system suited to the
making of political decisions. 66
What is unique about the Lockerbie case is that the court is
presented with a treaty violation under the Montreal
Convention which in a sense has been "pre-judged" by the
Security Council in Resolutions 731, 748 and 883 with
particular reference to the demand that Libya surrender the
accused to the United Kingdom or the United States for trial.
If the court should adjudicate the liability of the parties

according to the treaty, Libya's failure to bring the accused to
trial within its own jurisdiction, absent an extradition treaty
with the requesting states, can be construed as a violation of
Article 7 of the treaty, which provides that in the absence of
extradition that the case be submitted to the competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Article 7 also
provides that, "[t]hose authorities shall take their decision in
the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offense of a
serious nature under the law of that state.'>67 Unquestionably,
Libya has failed to do this arguing that the United States has

66.
67.

1d.
24 U.s.T. § 571.
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not cooperated under the treaty by providing the necessary
evidence to support the prosecution of the accused. These
questions undoubtedly will have to be resolved by the Court.
A larger question emerges with respect to the issue of
sanctions. If the court is persuaded to address the propriety of
sanctions under the Security Council resolutions after deciding
culpability under the treaty, the issue of judicial review will
have to be faced.
VI. CONCLUSION
Finding a path through this legal labyrinth is not easy.
Unquestionably, the court had little choice but to accept
jurisdiction of this treaty dispute upon Libya's Application.
But it has not been asked for an advisory opinion and, instead,
must settle an active dispute. Under Article 14 (1) of the
Convention, it must adjudicate this dispute in conformity with
Article 38 of the statute of the court. There is nothing in
Article 38 which requires the court to accord any special legal
effect to a resolution of the Security Council,except to the
extent that a Security Council resolution is presumptively valid
under the U.N. Charter. The ICJ may have to decide the
question on the basis of the evidence presented and at the end
of the day it will have to conclude whether the sanctions which
have been imposed by the Security Council on Libya are
justified.
One can envision the following scenarios:
(1) The court affirms Libya's right under the Montreal
Convention to decline extradition of the accused while
at the same time fmding that Libya has violated Article
7 of the treaty by failing to "submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution."
The court may not be persuaded that Libya needs
evidence from the United States to justify going forward
with the prosecutions and Libya could be held to have
violated this provision of the treaty. The sanctions
could therefore be justified, to be followed by the

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999

25

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 5 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 10

284

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW

[Vol. 5:1

possibility of additional sanctions to include, for
example, export restrictions on petroleum products.
(2) The court finds that the United States has acted in
bad faith by refusing to supply the necessary evidence to
justify prosecution of the accused, in which event Libya
could be found justified in failing to bring the accused to
trial in Libya. In that case, the justification for the
sanctions would be called into question and
international support for Resolutions 731, 748 and 883
would be undermined.
(3) An agreement is reached permitting the trial of the
accused in the Netherlands under Scottish law. If this
results in the lifting of sanctions, this should bring the
matter to an end leaving the court with nothing to
decide.
In short, a political solution to this dispute may well resolve
the matter without the need for further proceedings before the
court. 68 But a precedent has already been set. In the future, on
the basis of the lengthy opinions which have been written by
these eminent jurists, there now exists considerable authority
for a state, wishing to challenge the legality of a Security
Council resolution, to point to the Lockerbie cases as a basis for
the ICJ to become involved in an international political dispute
which has already precipitated action by the Security Council.
The court could be persuaded to exercise its jurisdiction over a

68. In December, 1998, Secretary General Kofi Annan visited Libya in an effort to
secure the surrender of the two suspects for trial in the Netherlands. On December 16,
1998, it was reported in the Straits Times, that shortly after he spoke to the Libyan
. General Peoples Congress, a spokesman for that country's top legislative body reported
that it was satisfied with a plan to try the suspects in a neutral country "with all
guarantees." On December 17, 1998, the court, on application of the United Kingdom
granted an extension of time to March 31, 1999 for the filing of its Counter-Memorial,
and a like order was entered on application of the United States. This followed a
change of policy by the U.S. and the U.K. allowing the trial to be conducted in the
Netherlands. However, the parties have yet to agree on all conditions.
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treaty dispute which might be implicated in connection with a
breach of the peace. 69
Whether this case will ultimately determine the contours of
judicial review by the court of Security Council competence
remains an open question. The very fact that the court has
accepted jurisdiction and has chosen to adjudicate this
controversy under the Montreal Convention will mean that
these cases will likely serve as precedents for future
applications by states wishing to avoid the impact of Security
Council resolutions.

69. Judge Jennings envisioned the possibility that in such circumstances the court
might be asked to interfere with peacekeeping operations (supra note 65). But if the
peacekeeping operations are being undertaken illegally, why shouldn't a state have
recourse to the ICJ?
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